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Abstract. Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) have domi-
nated as the best performers in machine learning, but can be challenged
by adversarial attacks. In this paper, we defend against adversarial at-
tacks using neural architecture search (NAS) which is based on a compre-
hensive search of denoising blocks, weight-free operations, Gabor filters
and convolutions. The resulting anti-bandit NAS (ABanditNAS) incor-
porates a new operation evaluation measure and search process based on
the lower and upper confidence bounds (LCB and UCB). Unlike the con-
ventional bandit algorithm using UCB for evaluation only, we use UCB
to abandon arms for search efficiency and LCB for a fair competition
between arms. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ABanditNAS is
faster than other NAS methods, while achieving an 8.73% improvement
over prior arts on CIFAR-10 under PGD-7.
Keywords: Neural Architecture Search (NAS), Bandit, Adversarial De-
fense
1 Introduction
The success of deep learning models [4] have been demonstrated on various com-
puter vision tasks such as image classification [19], instance segmentation [26]
and object detection [37]. However, existing deep models are sensitive to ad-
versarial attacks [6,17,38], where adding an imperceptible perturbation to input
images can cause the models to perform incorrectly. Szegedy et. al [38] also ob-
serve that these adversarial examples are transferable across multiple models
such that adversarial examples generated for one model might mislead other
models as well. Therefore, models deployed in the real world scenarios are sus-
ceptible to adversarial attacks [25]. While many methods have been proposed
to defend against these attacks [38,8], improving the network training process
proves to be one of the most popular. These methods inject adversarial examples
into the training data to retrain the network [17,22,1]. Similarly, pre-processing
? Corresponding author.
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Fig. 1. ABanditNAS is mainly divided into two steps: sampling using LCB and aban-
doning based on UCB.
defense methods modify adversarial inputs to resemble clean inputs [36,23] by
transforming the adversarial images into clean images before they are fed into
the classifier.
Overall, however, finding adversarially robust architectures using neural ar-
chitecture search (NAS) shows even more promising results [8,12,28,30]. NAS
has attracted a great attention with remarkable performance in various deep
learning tasks. In [8] the researchers investigate the dependence of adversarial
robustness on the network architecture via NAS. A neural architecture search
framework for adversarial medical image segmentation is proposed by [30]. [28]
leverages one-shot NAS [3] to understand the influence of network architectures
against adversarial attacks. Although promising performance is achieved in ex-
isting NAS based methods, this direction still remains largely unexplored.
In this paper, we consider NAS for model defense by treating it as a multi-
armed bandit problem and introduce a new anti-bandit algorithm into adver-
sarially robust network architecture search. To improve the robustness to ad-
versarial attacks, a comprehensive search space is designed by including diverse
operations, such as denoising blocks, weight-free operations, Gabor filters and
convolutions. However, searching a robust network architecture is more chal-
lenging than traditional NAS, due to the complicated search space, and learning
inefficiency caused by adversarial training. We develop an anti-bandit algorithm
based on both the upper confidence bound (UCB) and the lower confidence
bound (LCB) to handle the huge and complicated search space, where the num-
ber of operations that define the space can be 960! Our anti-bandit algorithm
uses UCB to reduce the search space, and LCB to guarantee that every arm is
fairly tested before being abandoned.
Making use of the LCB, operations which have poor performance early, such
as parameterized operations, will be given more chances but they are thrown
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away once they are confirmed to be bad. Meanwhile, weight-free operations will
be compared with parameterized operations only when they are well trained.
Based on the observation that the early optimal operation is not necessarily
the optimal one in the end, and the worst operations in the early stage usually
has a worse performance at the end [46], we exploit UCB to prune the worst
operations earlier, after a fair performance evaluation via LCB. This means that
the operations we finally reserve are certainly a near optimal solution. On the
other hand, with the operation pruning process, the search space becomes smaller
and smaller, leading to an efficient search process. Our framework shown in Fig. 1
highlights the anti-bandit NAS (ABanditNAS) for finding a robust architecture
from a very complicated search space. The contributions of our paper are as
follows:
– ABanditNAS is developed to solve the adversarially robust optimization and
architecture search in a unified framework. We introduce an anti-bandit al-
gorithm based on a specific operation search strategy with a lower and an
upper bound, which can learn a robust architecture based on a comprehen-
sive operation space.
– The search space is greatly reduced by our anti-bandit pruning method which
abandons operations with less potential, and significantly reduces the search
complexity from exponential to polynomial, i.e., O(K |EM|×v) to O(K2 × T )
(see Section 3.4 for details).
– Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed algorithm achieves
better performance than other adversarially robust models on commonly
used MNIST and CIFAR-10.
2 Related Work
Neural architecture search (NAS). NAS becomes one of the most promising
technologies in the deep learning paradigm. Reinforcement learning (RL) based
methods [49,48] train and evaluate more than 20, 000 neural networks across
500 GPUs over 4 days. The recent differentiable architecture search (DARTS)
reduces the search time by formulating the task in a differentiable manner [24].
However, DARTS and its variants [24,42] might be less efficient for a complicated
search space. To speed up the search process, a one-shot strategy is introduced
to do NAS within a few GPU days [24,32]. In this one-shot architecture search,
each architecture in the search space is considered as a sub-graph sampled from a
super-graph, and the search process can be accelerated by parameter sharing [32].
Though [8] uses NAS with reinforcement learning to find adversarially robust
architectures that achieve good results, it is insignificant compared to the search
time. Those methods also seldom consider high diversity in operations closely
related to model defense in the search strategy.
Adversarial attacks. Recent research has shown that neural networks ex-
hibit significant vulnerability to adversarial examples. After the discovery of ad-
versarial examples by [38], [17] proposes the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
to generate adversarial examples with a single gradient step. Later, in [22], the
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researchers propose the Basic Iterative Method (BIM), which takes multiple and
smaller FGSM steps to improve FGSM, but renders the adversarial training
very slow. This iterative adversarial attack is further strengthened by adding
multiple random restarts, and is also incorporated into the adversarial training
procedure. In addition, projected gradient descent (PGD) [27] adversary attack,
a variant of BIM with a uniform random noise as initialization, is recognized to
be one of the most powerful first-order attacks [1]. Other popular attacks include
the Carlini and Wagner Attack [6] and Momentum Iterative Attack [11]. Among
them, [6] devises state-of-the-art attacks under various pixel-space lp norm-ball
constraints by proposing multiple adversarial loss functions.
Model defense. In order to resist attacks, various methods have been pro-
posed. A category of defense methods improve networks training regime to
counter adversarial attacks. The most common method is adversarial training
[22,29] with adversarial examples added to the training data. In [27], a defense
method called Min-Max optimization is introduced to augment the training data
with first-order attack samples. [39] investigates fast training of adversarially ro-
bust models to perturb both the images and the labels during training. There
are also some model defense methods that target at removing adversarial per-
turbation by transforming the input images before feeding them to the network
[23,1,18]. In [13,9], the effect of JPEG compression is investigated for removing
adversarial noise. In [31], the authors apply a set of filters such as median filters
and averaging filters to remove perturbation. In [43], a ME-Net method is in-
troduced to destroy the adversarial noise and re-enforce the global structure of
the original images. With the development of NAS, finding adversarially robust
architectures using NAS is another promising direction [8], which is worth in-
depth exploration. Recently, [30] designs three types of primitive operation set in
the search space to automatically find two-cell architectures for semantic image
segmentation, especially medical image segmentation, leading to a NAS-Unet
backbone network.
In this paper, an anti-bandit algorithm is introduced into NAS, and we de-
velop a new optimization framework to generate adversarially robust networks.
Unlike [20] using bandits to produce black-box adversarial samples, we propose
an anti-bandit algorithm to obtain a robust network architecture. In addition,
existing NAS-based model defense methods either target at different applications
from ours or are less efficient for object classification [8,12,28,30].
3 Anti-Bandit Neural Architecture Search
3.1 Search Space
Following [49,24,46,47,7], we search for computation cells as the building blocks
of the final architecture. Different from these approaches, we search for v (v > 2)
kinds of cells instead of only normal and reduction cells. Although it increases
the search space, our search space reduction in ABanditNAS can make the search
efficient enough. A cell is a fully-connected directed acyclic graph (DAG) of M
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Fig. 2. (a) A cell containing four intermediate nodes B1, B2, B3, B4 that apply
sampled operations on the input node B0. B0 is from the output of the previous cell.
The output node concatenates the outputs of the four intermediate nodes. (b) Gabor
Filter. (c) A generic denoising block. Following [41], it wraps the denoising operation
with a 1× 1 convolution and an identity skip connection [19].
nodes, i.e., {B1, B2, ..., BM} as shown in Fig. 2(a). Each node Bi takes its de-
pendent nodes as input, and generates an output through the selected operation
Bj = o
(i,j)(Bi). Here each node is a specific tensor (e.g., a feature map in con-
volutional neural networks) and each directed edge (i, j) between Bi and Bj
denotes an operation o(i,j)(.), which is sampled from Ω(i,j) = {o(i,j)1 , ..., o(i,j)K }.
Note that the constraint i < j ensures that there are no cycles in a cell. Each cell
takes the output of the previous cell as input, and we define this node belonging
to the previous cell as the input node B0 of the current cell for easy description.
The set of the operations Ω consists of K = 9 operations. Following [24], there
are seven normal operations that are the 3×3 max pooling, 3×3 average pooling,
skip connection (identity), 3× 3 convolution with rate 2, 5× 5 convolution with
rate 2, 3 × 3 depth-wise separable convolution, and 5 × 5 depth-wise separable
convolution. The other two are 3×3 Gabor filter and denoising block. Therefore,
the size of the whole search space is K |EM|×v, where EM is the set of possible
edges with M intermediate nodes in the fully-connected DAG. The search space
of a cell is constructed by the operations of all the edges, denoted as {Ω(i,j)}. In
our case with M = 4 and v = 6, together with the input node, the total number
of cell structures in the search space is 9(1+2+3+4)×6 = 910×6.
Gabor filter. Gabor wavelets [16,15] were invented by Dennis Gabor using
complex functions to serve as a basis for Fourier transform in information theory
applications. The Gabor wavelets (kernels or filters) in Fig. 2(b) are defined as:
exp(−x′2+γ2y′22σ2 ) cos(2pi x
′
λ + ψ), where x
′ = x cos θ + y sin θ and y′ = −x sin θ +
y cos θ. We set σ, γ, λ, ψ and θ to be learnable parameters. Note that the symbols
used here apply only to the Gabor filter and are different from the symbols used
in the rest of this paper. An important property of the wavelets is that the
product of its standard deviations is minimized in both time and frequency
domains. Also, robustness is another important property which we use here [33].
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Denoising block. In [41], the researchers suggest that adversarial pertur-
bations on images can result in noise in the features. Thus, a denoising block
Fig. 2(c) is used to improve adversarial robustness via feature denoising. Sim-
ilarly, we add the non-local mean denoising block [5] to the search space to
denoise the features. It computes a denoised feature map z of an input feature
map x by taking a weighted mean of the features over all spatial locations L as
zp =
1
C(x)
∑
∀q∈L f(xp, xq) ·xq, where f(xp, xq) is a feature-dependent weighting
function and C(x) is a normalization function. Also, the denosing block needs
huge computations because of the matrix multiplication between features.
It is known that adversarial training is more challenging than that of natural
training [34], which adds an additional burden to NAS. For example, adversarial
training using the F -step PGD attack needs roughly F + 1 times more com-
putation. Also, more operations added to the search space are another burden.
To solve these problems, we introduce operation space reduction based on the
UCB bandit algorithm into NAS, to significantly reduce the cost of GPU hours,
leading to our efficient ABanditNAS.
3.2 Adversarial Optimization for ABanditNAS
Adversarial training [27] is a method for learning networks so that they are
robust to adversarial attacks. Given a network fθ parameterized by θ, a dataset
(xe, ye), a loss function l and a threat model ∆, the learning problem is typically
cast as the following optimization problem: minθ
∑
e maxδ∈∆ l
(
fθ(xe + δ), ye
)
,
where δ is the adversarial perturbation. A typical choice for a threat model is to
take ∆ = {δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ } for some  > 0, where ‖ · ‖∞ is some l∞-norm distance
metric and  is the adversarial manipulation budget. This is the l∞ threat model
used by [27] and what we consider in this paper. The procedure for adversarial
training is to use attacks to approximate the inner maximization over ∆, followed
by some variation of gradient descent on the model parameters θ. For example,
one of the earliest versions of adversarial training uses the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [17] to approximate the inner maximization. This could be
seen as a relatively inaccurate approximation of the inner maximization for l∞
perturbations, and has the closed form solution: θ =  · sign
(
∇xl
(
f(x), y
))
.
A better approximation of the inner maximization is to take multiple, smaller
FGSM steps of size α instead. However, the number of gradient computations
casused by the multiple steps is proportional to O(EF ) in a single epoch, where
E is the size of the dataset and F is the number of steps taken by the PGD
adversary. This is F times greater than the standard training which has O(E)
gradient computations per epoch, and so the adversarial training is typically F
times slower. To speed up the adversarial training, we combine the FGSM with
random initialization [40].
3.3 Anti-Bandit
In machine learning, the multi-armed bandit problem [2,35] is a classic reinforce-
ment learning (RL) problem that exemplifies the exploration-exploitation trade-
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off dilemma: shall we stick to an arm that gave high reward so far (exploitation)
or rather probe other arms further (exploration)? The Upper Confidence Bound
(UCB) is widely used for dealing with the exploration-exploitation dilemma in
the multi-armed bandit problem. For example, the idea of bandit is exploited to
improve many classical RL methods such as Monte Carlo [21] and Q-learning
[14]. The most famous one is AlphaGo [35], which uses the Monte Carlo Tree
Search (MCTS) algorithm to play the board game Go but based on a very pow-
erful computing platform unavailable to common researchers. Briefly, the UCB
algorithm chooses at trial the arm k that maximizes
rˆk +
√
2 logN
nk
, (1)
where rˆk is the average reward obtained from arm k, and nk is the number of
times arm k has been played up to trial N . The first term in Eq. 1 is the value
term which favors actions that look good historically, and the second is the
exploration term which makes actions get an exploration bonus that grows with
logN . The total value can be interpreted as the upper bound of a confidence
interval, so that the true mean reward of each arm k with a high probability is
below this UCB.
The UCB in bandit is not applicable in NAS, because it is too time-consuming
to choose an arm from a huge search space (a huge number of arms, e.g., 960),
particularly when limited computational resources are available. To solve the
problem, we introduce an anti-bandit algorithm to reduce the arms for the huge-
armed problem by incorporating both the upper confidence bound (UCB) and
the lower confidence bound (LCB) into the conventional bandit algorithm. We
first define LCB as
rˆk −
√
2 logN
nk
. (2)
LCB is designed to sample an arm from a huge number of arms for one more
trial (later in Eq. 3). A smaller LCB means that the less played arm (a smaller
nk) is given a bigger chance to be sampled for a trial. Unlike the conventional
bandit based on the maximum UCB (Eq. 1) to choose an arm, our UCB (Eq. 6)
is used to abandon the arm operation with the minimum value, which is why we
call our algorithm anti-bandit.
Our anti-bandit algorithm is specifically designed for the huge-armed bandit
problem by reducing the number of arms based on the UCB. Together with the
LCB, it can guarantee every arm is fairly tested before being abandoned.
3.4 Anti-Bandit Strategy for ABanditNAS
As described in [44,46], the validation accuracy ranking of different network ar-
chitectures is not a reliable indicator of the final architecture quality. However,
the experimental results actually suggest a nice property that if an architecture
performs poorly in the beginning of training, there is little hope that it can be
part of the final optimal model [46]. As the training progresses, this observation
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Algorithm 1: ABanditNAS
Input: Training data, validation data, searching hyper-graph, adversarial
perturbation δ, adversarial manipulation budget , K = 9,
hyper-parameters α, λ = 0.7, T = 3.
Output: The remaining optimal structure;
1 t = 0; c = 0;
2 Get initial performance m
(i,j)
k,0 ;
3 while (K > 1) do
4 c← c+ 1;
5 t← t+ 1;
6 Calculate sL(o
(i,j)
k ) using Eq. 3;
7 Calculate p(o
(i,j)
k ) using Eq. 4;
8 Select an architecture by sampling one operation based on p(o
(i,j)
k ) from
Ω(i,j) for every edge;
9 // Train adversarially the selected architecture
10 for e = 1, ..., E do
11 δ = Uniform(−, );
12 δ ← δ + α· sign
(
∇xl
(
f(xe + δ), ye
))
;
13 δ = max
(
min(δ, ),−);
14 θ ← θ −∇θl
(
fθ(xe + δ), ye
)
;
15 end
16 Get the accuracy a on the validation data;
17 Update the performance m
(i,j)
k,t using Eq. 5;
18 if c = K ∗ T then
19 Calculate sU (o
(i,j)
k ) using Eq. 6;
20 Update the search space {Ω(i,j)} using Eq. 7;
21 c = 0;
22 K ← K − 1;
23 end
24 end
is more and more certain. Based on this observation, we derive a simple yet ef-
fective operation abandoning method. During training, along with the increasing
epochs, we progressively abandon the worst performing operation for each edge.
Unlike [46] which just uses the performance as the evaluation metric to decide
which operation should be pruned, we use the anti-bandit algorithm described
next to make a decision about which one should be pruned.
Following UCB in the bandit algorithm, we obtain the initial performance for
each operation in every edge. Specifically, we sample one from the K operations
in Ω(i,j) for every edge, then obtain the validation accuracy a which is the initial
performance m
(i,j)
k,0 by training adversarially the sampled network for one epoch,
and finally assigning this accuracy to all the sampled operations.
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By considering the confidence of the kth operation with the UCB for every
edge, the LCB is calculated by
sL(o
(i,j)
k ) = m
(i,j)
k,t −
√
2 logN
n
(i,j)
k,t
, (3)
where N is to the total number of samples, n
(i,j)
k,t refers to the number of times
the kth operation of edge (i, j) has been selected, and t is the index of the epoch.
The first item in Eq. 3 is the value term which favors the operations that look
good historically and the second is the exploration term which allows operations
to get an exploration bonus that grows with logN . The selection probability for
each operation is defined as
p(o
(i,j)
k ) =
exp{−sL(o(i,j)k )}∑
m exp{−sL(o(i,j)m )}
. (4)
The minus sign in Eq. 4 means that we prefer to sample operations with a smaller
confidence. After sampling one operation for every edge based on p(o
(i,j)
k ), we ob-
tain the validation accuracy a by training adversarially the sampled network for
one epoch, and then update the performance m
(i,j)
k,t which historically indicates
the validation accuracy of all the sampled operations o
(i,j)
k as
m
(i,j)
k,t = (1− λ)m(i,j)k,t−1 + λ ∗ a, (5)
where λ is a hyper-parameter.
Finally, after K ∗ T samples where T is a hyper-parameter, we calculate the
confidence with the UCB according to Eq. 1 as
sU (o
(i,j)
k ) = m
(i,j)
k,t +
√
2 logN
n
(i,j)
k,t
. (6)
The operation with the minimal UCB for every edge is abandoned. This means
that the operations that are given more opportunities, but result in poor perfor-
mance, are removed. With this pruning strategy, the search space is significantly
reduced from |Ω(i,j)|10×6 to (|Ω(i,j)| − 1)10×6, and the reduced space becomes
Ω(i,j) ← Ω(i,j) − {arg min
o
(i,j)
k
sU (o
(i,j)
k )}, ∀(i, j). (7)
The reduction procedure is carried out repeatedly until the optimal structure is
obtained where there is only one operation left in each edge. Our anti-bandit
search algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Complexity Analysis. There are O(K |EM|×v) combinations in the process
of finding the optimal architecture in the search space with v kinds of different
cells. In contrast, ABanditNAS reduces the search space for every K ∗T epochs.
Therefore, the complexity of the proposed method is
O(T ×
K∑
k=2
k) = O(TK2). (8)
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4 Experiments
We demonstrate the robustness of our ABanditNAS on two benchmark datasets
(MNIST and CIFAR-10) for the image classification task, and compare ABan-
ditNAS with state-of-the-art robust models.
4.1 Experiment Protocol
In our experiments, we search architectures on an over-parameterized network
on MNIST and CIFAR-10, and then evaluate the best architecture on corre-
sponding datasets. Unlike previous NAS works [24,42,32], we learn six kinds of
cells, instead of two, to increase the diversity of the network.
Search and Training Settings. In the search process, the over-parameterized
network is constructed with six cells, where the 2nd and 4th cells are used to
double the channels of the feature maps and halve the height and width of the
feature maps, respectively. There are M = 4 intermediate nodes in each cell.
The hyperparameter T which denotes the sampling times is set to 3, so the to-
tal number of epochs is
∑K
k=2 k ∗ T . The hyperparameter λ is set to 0.7. The
evalution of the hyperparameters is provided in the supplementary file. A large
batch size of 512 is used. And we use an additional regularization cutout [10]
for CIFAR-10. The initial number of channels is 16. We employ FGSM adver-
sarial training combined with random initialization and  = 0.3 for MNIST, and
 = 0.031 for CIFAR-10. We use SGD with momentum to optimize the network
weights, with an initial learning rate of 0.025 for MNIST and 0.1 for CIFAR-10
(annealed down to zero following a cosine schedule), a momentum of 0.9 and a
weight decay of 3× 10−4 for MNIST/CIFAR-10.
After search, the six cells are stacked to get the final networks. To adver-
sarially train them, we employ FGSM combined with random initialization and
 = 0.3 on MNIST, and use PGD-7 with  = 0.031 and step size of 0.0078 on
CIFAR-10. Next, we use ABanditNAS-V to represent ABanditNAS with V cells
in the training process. The number V can be different from the number v. The
initial number of channels is 16 for MNIST, and 48 for CIFAR-10. We use a
batch size of 96 and an additional regularization cutout [10] for CIFAR-10. We
employ the SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.025 for MNIST and
0.1 for CIFAR-10 (annealed down to zero following a cosine schedule without
restart), a momentum of 0.9, a weight decay of 3×10−4, and a gradient clipping
at 5. We train 200 epochs for MNIST and CIAFR-10.
White-Box vs. Black-Box Attack Settings. In an adversarial setting,
there are two main threat models: white-box attacks where the adversary pos-
sesses complete knowledge of the target model, including its parameters, archi-
tecture and the training method, and black-box attacks where the adversary
feeds perturbed images at test time, which are generated without any knowl-
edge of the target model, and observes the output. We evaluate the robustness
of our proposed defense against both settings. The perturbation size  and step
size are the same as those in the adversarial training for both the white-box and
black-box attacks. The numbers of iterations for MI-FGSM and BIM are both
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Architecture
Clean FGSM PGD-40 PGD-100 # Params Search Cost Search
(%) (%) (%) (%) (M) (GPU days) Method
LeNet [27] 98.8 95.6 93.2 91.8 3.27 - Manual
LeNet (Prep. + Adv. train [43]) 97.4 - 94.0 91.8 0.06147 - Manual
UCBNAS 99.5 98.67 96.94 95.4 0.082 0.13 Bandit
UCBNAS (pruning) 99.52 98.56 96.62 94.96 0.066 0.08 Bandit
ABanditNAS-6 99.52 98.94 97.01 95.7 0.089 0.08 Anti-Bandit
Table 1. Robustness of ABanditNAS under FGSM and PGD attacks on MNIST.
White-Box Black-Box
Structure Clean MI-FGSM BIM PGD MI-FGSM BIM PGD
MNIST ( = 0.3)
LeNet [27] (copy) 98.8 - - 93.2 - - 96.0
ABanditNAS-6 (copy) 99.52 97.41 97.63 97.58 99.09 99.12 99.02
CIFAR-10 ( = 0.031)
Wide-ResNet [27] (copy) 87.3 - - 50.0 - - 64.2
NASNet [8] (copy) 93.2 - - 50.1 - - 75.0
ABanditNAS-6 (copy) 87.16 48.77 47.59 50.0 74.94 75.78 76.13
ABanditNAS-6 (ResNet-18) 87.16 48.77 47.59 50.0 77.06 77.63 78.0
ABanditNAS-10 (ResNet-18) 90.64 54.19 55.31 58.74 80.25 80.8 81.26
Table 2. Robustness of our model in the white-box and black-box settings on MNIST
and CIFAR-10. Here  is the perturbation size. PGD means PGD-40 for MNIST and
PGD-7 for CIFAR-10. ‘copy’ means we use a copied network to generate black-box
adversarial examples, and ‘ResNet-18’ means using ResNet-18 to generate black-box
adversarial examples.
set to 10 with a step size and a standard perturbation size the same as those in
the white-box attacks. We evaluate ABanditNAS against transfer-based attack
where a copy of the victim network is trained with the same training setting. We
apply attacks similar to the white-box attacks on the copied network to gener-
ate black-box adversarial examples. We also generate adversarial samples using
a ResNet-18 model, and feed them to the model obtainedly ABanditNAS.
4.2 Results on Different Datasets
MNIST. Owing to the search space reduction by anti-bandit, the entire search
process only requires 1.93 hours on a single NVIDIA Titan V GPU. For MNIST,
the structure searched by ABanditNAS is directly used for training. We evalu-
ate the trained network by 40 and 100 attack steps, and compare our method
with LeNet [27] and MeNet [43] in Table 1. From these results, we can see
that ABanditNAS using FGSM adversarial training with random initialization
is more robust than LeNet with PGD-40 adversarial training, no matter which
attack is used. Although MeNet uses matrix estimation (ME) as preprocessing
to destroy the adversarial structure of the noise, our method still performs bet-
ter. In addition, our method has the best performance (99.52%) on the clean
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Architecture
Clean MI-FGSM PGD-7 PGD-20 # Params Search Cost Search
(%) (%) (%) (%) (M) (GPU days) Method
VGG-16 [45] 85.16 - 46.04 (PGD-10) - - - Manual
ResNet [27] 79.4 - 47.1 43.7 0.46 - Manual
Wide-ResNet [27] 87.3 - 50.0 45.8 45.9 - Manual
NASNet [8] 93.2 - 50.1 - - ∼ 7× 2000 RL
UCBNAS (pruning) 89.54 53.12 54.55 45.33 8.514 0.08 Bandit
ABanditNAS-6 87.16 48.77 50.0 45.9 2.892 0.08 Anti-Bandit
ABanditNAS-6 (larger) 87.31 52.01 51.24 45.79 12.467 0.08 Anti-Bandit
ABanditNAS-10 90.64 54.19 58.74 50.51 5.188 0.08 Anti-Bandit
Table 3. Validation accuracy and robustness of various models trained on CIFAR-10.
Note that the search cost of NASNet which is unknown is estimated based on [8].
‘PGD-10’ means the result of VGG-16 is under PGD-10 attack which comes from [45].
images with a strong robustness. For the black-box attacks, Table 2 shows that
they barely affect the structures searched by ABanditNAS compared with other
models, either manually designed or searched by NAS. As illustrated in Fig. 3(a),
with the increase of the perturbation size, our network’s performance does not
drop significantly, showing the robustness of our method.
(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR-10
Fig. 3. Robustness of ABanditNAS against different white-box attacks for various per-
turbation budgets.
We also apply the conventional bandit which samples operations based on
UCB to search the network, leading to UCBNAS. The main differences between
UCBNAS and ABanditNAS lie in that UCBNAS only uses UCB as an evalua-
tion measure to select an operation, and there is no operation pruning involved.
Compared with UCBNAS, ABanditNAS can get better performance and use
less search time under adversarial attacks as shown in Table 1. Also, to further
demonstrate the effectiveness of our ABanditNAS, we use UCBNAS with prun-
ing to search for a robust model, which not only uses UCB to select an operation,
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(b) Second Cell
B_{0}
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(c) Third Cell
B_{0} B_1dtp_blok_3x3
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conv_3x3
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Output
B_4avg_pool_3x3
(f) Sixth Cell
Fig. 4. Detailed structures of the best cells discovered on CIFAR-10 using FGSM with
random initialization.
but also prune operation of less potential. Although UCBNAS (pruning) is as
fast as ABanditNAS, it has worse performance than ABanditNAS beceuse of
unfair competitions between operations before pruning.
CIFAR-10. The results for different architectures on CIFAR-10 are sum-
marized in Table 3. We use one Titan V GPU to search, and the batch size is
512. The entire search process takes about 1.94 hours. We consider V = 6 and
V = 10 cells for training. In addition, we also train a larger network variant with
100 initial channels for V = 6. Compared with Wide-ResNet, ABanditNAS-10
achieves not only a better performance (50.0% vs. 58.74%) in PGD-7, but also
fewer parameters (45.9M vs. 5.188M). Although the result of VGG-16 is under
PGD-10, ABanditNAS-10 achieves a better performance under more serious at-
tack PGD-20 (46.04% vs. 50.51%). When compared with NASNet4 which has
a better performance on clean images, our method obtains better performance
on adversarial examples with a much faster search speed (∼ 7× 2000 vs. 0.08).
Note that the results in Table 3 are the best we got, which are unstable and
need more trials to get the results. Table 2 shows the black-box attacks barely
affect the networks obtained by ABanditNAS, much less than those by other
methods. In addition, Fig. 3(b) illustrates ABanditNAS is still robust when the
disturbance increases.
For the structure searched by ABanditNAS on CIFAR-10, we find that the
robust structure prefers pooling operations, Gabor filters and denosing blocks
(Fig. 4). The reasons lie in that the pooling can enhance the nonlinear modeling
capacity, Gabor filters can extract robust features, and the denosing block and
mean pooling act as smoothing filters for denosing. Gabor filters and denosing
blocks are usually set in the front of cell by ABanditNAS to denoise feature
encoded by the previous cell. The setting is consistent with [41], which demon-
strates the rationality of ABanditNAS.
4 Results are from [8].
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4.3 Ablation Study
The performances of the structures searched by ABanditNAS with different val-
ues of the λ are used to find the best λ. We train the structures under the same
setting.
Effect on the hyperparameter λ: The hyperparameter λ is used to bal-
ance the performance between the past and the current. Different values of λ
result in similar search costs. From Fig. 4.3, we can see that when λ = 0.7,
ABanditNAS is most robust.
Fig. 5. The performances of the structures searched by ABanditNAS with different
values of the hyperparameters T and λ.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed an ABanditNAS approach to design robust structures to
defend adversarial attacks. To solve the challenging search problem caused by
the complicated huge search space and the adversarial training process, we have
introduced an anti-bandit algorithm to improve the search efficiency. We have in-
vestigated the relationship between our strategy and potential operations based
on both lower and upper bounds. Extensive experiments have demonstrated that
the proposed ABanditNAS is much faster than other state-of-the-art NAS meth-
ods with a better performance in accuracy. Under adversarial attacks, ABandit-
NAS achieves much better performance than other methods.
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